Vulnerability and the embodied violence of war

Our paper refers to the concept of war as embodied violence and aims to examine the relevance of war in relation to the vulnerability of those involved. In the first part of the paper, the concept of vulnerability is introduced, highlighting its significance for a semantic shift in the representation of the subject of law as a self-standing, autonomous, and rational human being. In the second part of the paper, the capacity of human rights to protect the vulnerable individual is analyzed through references to contexts of war. Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, we critique the mere ontological characterization of vulnerability, since the recognition of vulnerable humans as deserving protection is tied to cognitive frames and shaped by political interests. War starkly reveals the political dimension of the relationship between vulnerability and the body, as well as the role of cognitive processes in distinguishing between categories of vulnerable subjects. The vulnerable body of the enemy is often stripped of its humanity and treated not as something to protect but as an object of retaliation. Warfare underscores the need for the concept of vulnerability to receive political support to be effective. Furthermore, warfare highlights the necessity (as Butler suggests) to reframe a cognitive frame that legitimizes the differentiation between types of vulnerabilities and, consequently, between types of humanity.