The paper analyses the relationship among public efficiency, exploitation of private individuals by the government and the role of constitutional constraints. First, it contains an exensive review of the Leviathan model based on Inman's formalization of Brennan and Buchanan theory. Secondly, an extension of such a model is proposed, in which public agents are separated into politicians and bureaucrats. In doing so, a "new" efficiency-equity trade-off arises, namely, the achievement of Pareto-efficiency through constitutional constraints is obtained, at a cost of a possible exploitation of private individuals, while the non-exploitation allocation is coupled with a possible Pareto-inefficiency
Public Efficiency and Constitutional Constraints: a Contribution Towards an Extended "Leviathan" Model
FONTINI, FULVIO
1998-01-01
Abstract
The paper analyses the relationship among public efficiency, exploitation of private individuals by the government and the role of constitutional constraints. First, it contains an exensive review of the Leviathan model based on Inman's formalization of Brennan and Buchanan theory. Secondly, an extension of such a model is proposed, in which public agents are separated into politicians and bureaucrats. In doing so, a "new" efficiency-equity trade-off arises, namely, the achievement of Pareto-efficiency through constitutional constraints is obtained, at a cost of a possible exploitation of private individuals, while the non-exploitation allocation is coupled with a possible Pareto-inefficiencyI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
