The paper critically assesses the recently enacted Article 22 of Law-Decree no. 90 of 2014 (converted by Law no. 114 of 2014), whose stated objective is to “rationalise” the numerous Italian “independent administrative authorities” (hereafter, IAAs). While some (long awaited) norms, such as the general ban of cross-authority appointment of apical bodies once their mandate has expired (para. 1) and the new regime for “successive incompatibilities” for the same bodies (para. 2), constitute a positive achievement, since they strengthen IAAs’ independence vis-à-vis political actors as well as the industry; the same does not hold for other norms. In particular, some critical remarks are proposed with regard to those parts of Article 22 that rewrite homogeneously (ie, irrespective of the different characters and powers exercised by various IAAs) the norms pertaining to the organisational and financial autonomy of IAAs, by limiting and/or rationalising some expenditures (paras 3 and 4). Para. 5 is devoted to another aspect, that does also impact on IAAs’ organisational autonomy, and that recalls the European-wide “querelle des sièges”. Finally, some minimal remarks are made with reference to a norm that seems to run counter the general spending review objective of Article 22, and that increases the number of components of the financial markets regulator Consob. Para. 7 concludes.
Razionalizzazione delle autorità indipendenti. Tagliare le spese, ma non gli artigli!
DI PORTO, Fabiana
2014-01-01
Abstract
The paper critically assesses the recently enacted Article 22 of Law-Decree no. 90 of 2014 (converted by Law no. 114 of 2014), whose stated objective is to “rationalise” the numerous Italian “independent administrative authorities” (hereafter, IAAs). While some (long awaited) norms, such as the general ban of cross-authority appointment of apical bodies once their mandate has expired (para. 1) and the new regime for “successive incompatibilities” for the same bodies (para. 2), constitute a positive achievement, since they strengthen IAAs’ independence vis-à-vis political actors as well as the industry; the same does not hold for other norms. In particular, some critical remarks are proposed with regard to those parts of Article 22 that rewrite homogeneously (ie, irrespective of the different characters and powers exercised by various IAAs) the norms pertaining to the organisational and financial autonomy of IAAs, by limiting and/or rationalising some expenditures (paras 3 and 4). Para. 5 is devoted to another aspect, that does also impact on IAAs’ organisational autonomy, and that recalls the European-wide “querelle des sièges”. Finally, some minimal remarks are made with reference to a norm that seems to run counter the general spending review objective of Article 22, and that increases the number of components of the financial markets regulator Consob. Para. 7 concludes.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
