This paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, price or quantity, taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition. While Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium, we show that, by introducing firm subsidization in the same setting, quantity can constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.
Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly
SCRIMITORE, Marcella
2013-01-01
Abstract
This paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, price or quantity, taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition. While Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium, we show that, by introducing firm subsidization in the same setting, quantity can constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium.File in questo prodotto:
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