The Worldboundness of Phenomenology

My aim is to stress the importance of Husserl's ambitious project of founding logic in the prelogical or prepredicative sphere of consciousness; a project which, in some ways, continues the effort raised formerly by the same to criticise the incomplete state of sciences, logics and matemathics included, that would lack of clarity and rationality, even if they have succeded in mastering over nature. In works like Formal and Transcendental Logic or Experience and Judgment, Husserl defends the point of view according to which logical operators (negation at first) have their roots in the prepredicative experience;disregarding this origin, they would turn into objectivations ('Sustruktionen'in the Crisis turn of phrase) which cover the latent function of transcendental subjectivity. By facing this kind of problems, we have to distinguish between modalizations (prepredicative level) and modalities (categorial level), and to remark that every logical construction, such as e. g. semantics of possible worlds, while having its foundation on the prepredicative level, is the result of a process of abstraction which takes it away from the world of life. The following short remarks will show also the necessity of a critical reflection on the notion of 'possibility', pointing to its rooting in the precategorial life of the Ego. The significance of this notion, in Husserl's point of view, is practical, because of its being tied to the notion of 'I can (Ich kann) as in sentences like 'I can move my hands'; semantics of possible world then would abstract from this practical move;moreover, it would also neglect the important fact that notions like possibility, imagination, variation, possible world, in a phenomenological point of view, come out as tied concepts which ought to be indexed with senses recalling their worldboundness.