A politicians-citizens interaction is modelled. The game under ambiguity is defined and solved. It is shown that the choice to impose constitutional constraints depends on the threshold level of ambiguity
Ambiguity in Citizens-Politicians Interactions
FONTINI, FULVIO
2003-01-01
Abstract
A politicians-citizens interaction is modelled. The game under ambiguity is defined and solved. It is shown that the choice to impose constitutional constraints depends on the threshold level of ambiguityFile in questo prodotto:
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