International economic agreements set out clauses providing for security exceptions. This study investigates the scope of these clauses, by arguing that both a broad notion of security interests and a wide state discretion to determine which are security measures risk compromising the overall equilibria of economic agreements.
The National Security Clauses in International Economic Agreements: A Loophole for States to Escape Their Obligations?
Di Benedetto, Saverio
2023-01-01
Abstract
International economic agreements set out clauses providing for security exceptions. This study investigates the scope of these clauses, by arguing that both a broad notion of security interests and a wide state discretion to determine which are security measures risk compromising the overall equilibria of economic agreements.File in questo prodotto:
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