This paper studies how districts' size interplays with heterogeneous preferences and spillovers in an economy with two tiers of government. In this model, local districts, which are considered to hold full decision making power, may find it convenient to delegate their power to the centralised legislature. Here, locally elected representatives set policy by negotiation under the threat that in case of disagreement decision making power goes back to local governments.

"District size: centralised versus decentralised free-riding", MPRA Paper 42691, University Library of Munich, Germany

GIURANNO, MICHELE GIUSEPPE
2012-01-01

Abstract

This paper studies how districts' size interplays with heterogeneous preferences and spillovers in an economy with two tiers of government. In this model, local districts, which are considered to hold full decision making power, may find it convenient to delegate their power to the centralised legislature. Here, locally elected representatives set policy by negotiation under the threat that in case of disagreement decision making power goes back to local governments.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11587/374506
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